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(Communicated by Yang Kuang)
Abstract. We assess pre-outbreak and during-outbreak vaccination as control strategies for SARS epidemics using a mathematical model that includes
susceptible, latent (traced and untraced), infectious, isolated and recovered individuals. Scenarios focusing on policies that include contact tracing and levels
of self-isolation among untraced infected individuals are explored. Bounds on
the proportion of pre-outbreak successfully vaccinated individuals are provided
using the the basic reproductive number. Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
on the reproductive number are carried out. The final epidemic size under
different vaccination scenarios is computed.

1. Introduction. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV). SARS is believed to have
emerged in the southern China province of Guangdong in November of 2002 [1].
The 2003 SARS epidemic was initially driven by international travel and lack of
knowledge of the disease’s etiological agent. The outbreak in Toronto, Canada, was
contained by expediting the rates of diagnosis and isolation of infectious cases. The
World Health Organization reported a total of 8, 422 cases with 916 deaths as of
August 2003, with China being the most affected country [1]. A mortality rate of
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. 92D30.
Key words and phrases. severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), mathematical model, vaccination, contact tracing, isolation.
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1% was recorded for people 24 years or younger, 6% for people between 25 and 44,
15% for people between 45 and 64, and greater than 50% for people older than 65
years [2].
SARS symptoms include high fever, headaches, body aches, mild respiratory
symptoms at the outset, diarrhea, and usually a development of a dry cough within
seven days [3]. Most SARS patients develop pneumonia [3]. SARS is mainly transmitted by direct close contact [3]. The mean latency period for SARS (the period
that a person is infected but not yet infectious) is approximately 6.4 days [4].
Suspected cases were hospitalized at a mean rate of 1/4.85 days−1 . Recovered individuals were discharged from hospitals on average 23.5 days after diagnosis; others
died 35.9 days after diagnosis [4].
A search for a SARS vaccine began during the outbreak. The National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has conducted vaccine studies on mice,
which developed SARS antibodies after the first dose and became immune after a
second dose [5]. Experiments on African green monkeys (Cercopithecus Aethiops)
have also been conducted [6]. Researchers from the NIAID modified a vaccine for
a known respiratory disease virus similar to SARS, HPIV3, through the insertion
of the SARS-S protein (the only protein compound which aids in the process of
attaching to cells of the human respiratory tract and infecting the cells as well
[7]). This intranasal vaccine was given to four monkeys while the control group
(four monkeys) received the modified HPIV3 without the SARS-S protein [6, 7].
The four immunized test monkeys did not develop SARS infection when exposed
28 days after vaccination. The four monkeys in the control developed SARS after
exposure [6, 8]. This vaccine would be ineffective for highly susceptible humans,
because most adults have immunity to the generalized vector of HPIV3 from childhood illness [8]. That is, their immune systems cannot produce antibodies against
the SARS-S protein in the HPIV3 vector [8].
Sinovac Biotech, a Chinese company, is in the process of testing a SARS vaccine
made of dead samples of the SARS-CoV on humans. The high-dosage (32 su/ml
antigen) SARS vaccine was administered to the “first 6 people of the second group
of 18 volunteers, and after a 72-hour observation period, no adverse side-effects
were observed” [9].
In this paper, we explore the impact of two vaccination strategies, namely the
effect of pre-outbreak vaccination (where the susceptible population is reduced by
a fraction of successfully vaccinated individuals before the disease invades) and the
impact of during-outbreak vaccination. The role of these intervention strategies is
also evaluated when these are implemented along with different levels of isolation
of infectious individuals.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces our epidemic model
and vaccination strategies; section 3 explores numerical pre-outbreak and duringoutbreak vaccination scenarios under different levels of isolation effectiveness; section 4 focuses on the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of the effective reproductive number, the key to our control strategies; and section 5 collects our conclusions.
2. Methods. Our model is based on previous work on SARS [10] and smallpox
[11]. We considered a single SARS outbreak and the possible implementation of two
different vaccination strategies (pre-outbreak and during-outbreak vaccination).
2.1. Pre-outbreak vaccination framework. Starting with a population of N
individuals, pre-outbreak vaccination reduces the susceptible population to (1 −
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Schematic representation of the state progression of individuals:
into the vaccination class V
Susceptible individuals move at the rate χ W
N
where χ is the rate at which susceptibles are vaccinated per day and  is the
efficacy of the vaccine. It is assumed that the rate of vaccination depends on
the proportion of people in the isolation class (W/N). En denotes the untraced
latent (infected, not yet infectious) individuals, and Ei are the traced latent
individuals. I denotes the infectious, untraced individuals, and W denotes the
infectious individuals (from classes Ei and I) placed into isolation. D and R
denote the dead and recovered classes, respectively. For parameter descriptions
see Table 1.

Figure 1.

σ)N before the start of the outbreak. That is, σN individuals are removed by
vaccination.
We follow the approach of Gani and Leach [11] and divide the latent subpopulation (individuals that are infected but cannot transmit the disease to others) into
two classes, untraced latent (En ) and traced latent individuals (Ei ). Our baseline
value for the latent period (1/k) is taken to be 6.37 days [12]. The average time
before a latent individual was either traced and isolated, or decided self-isolation is
1/k. Specifically, untraced latent individuals self-isolate at the rate θk or progress
into the infectious class I at a rate (1 − θ)k, where θ is the proportion of untraced
latent individuals that self-isolate, and I denotes the symptomatic, undiagnosed,
and infectious individuals [10]. Infectious individuals can also move into the isolation class W at rate α, die at rate δ, or recover at rate γ1 . Once under isolation,
individuals either die at the rate δ or recover at rate γ2 . That is, individuals in the
isolation class are assumed to recover faster than undiagnosed individuals (γ2 < γ1 )
[12].
It is also assumed that isolated individuals are less likely to interact with susceptibles and therefore contribute less to infection. This is modeled by parameter l,
which determines the isolation effectiveness as a reduction factor in the transmission
rate of individuals in the isolation class W [10]. Table 1 describes the parameters,
as well as the baseline values used. The model that describes the transmission dynamics of SARS, control measures, and pre-outbreak vaccination only is given by
the following system of nonlinear differential equations:

Ṡ




˙

E

n



 Ėi
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−kθEn − k(1 − θ)En + β(1 − ρ) (I+lW
S,
N
(I+lW )
−kEi + βρ N S,
kθEn + kEi + αI − (δ + γ2 )W,
k(1 − θ)En − (α + δ + γ1 )I,
γ1 I + γ2 W,
δI + δW.

(1)
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Table 1. Parameter definition and baseline values
Parameter
β
1/k
1/γ1
1/γ2
1/α
δ
σ
ρ
θ
l
χ

Note:

Definition
Baseline value
Transmission rate per day
0.25
Mean latent period (days)
6.37
Mean infectious period (days)
28.4
Mean infectious period for diagnosed individuals (days)
23.5
Mean period before diagnosis (days)
4.85
Disease induced death rate per day
0.0279
Proportion of susceptibles successfully vaccinated
[0, 1]
Proportion of latent population traced
[0, 1]
Proportion of untraced latent that self-isolate
[0, 1]
Effectiveness of isolation
[0, 1]
Vaccination rate
[0.2, 0.5]
Vaccine efficacy
[0.5, 0.9]
Parameters β, 1/k, 1/γ1 , 1/γ2 , 1/α, δ, and l were taken from [12].

where S(0) = (1 − σ)N . The effective reproductive number under pre-outbreak
vaccination can be obtained using the next generation method [13, 14] and is given
by:


(1 − ρ)lθ
(1 − ρ)(1 − θ)
(1 − ρ)l(1 − θ)α
ρl
∗
R0 (σ) = β(1 − σ)
+
+
+
.
δ + γ2
(δ + γ2 )(α + δ + γ1 )
α + δ + γ1
δ + γ2
Here, β is the transmission rate; (1 − σ) denotes the proportion of the population still susceptible at the start of the outbreak; (1−ρ)lθ
δ+γ2 is the contribution (to
infection) of untraced individuals who self-isolate;
tion of untraced diagnosed individuals;

(1−ρ)(1−θ)
α+δ+γ1

(1−ρ)l(1−θ)α
(δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 )

is the contribu-

is the contribution of untraced

ρl
undiagnosed individuals; and, δ+γ
is the contribution of those traced and isolated
2
individuals. Parameter σ > 0 means pre-outbreak vaccination has been implemented, which reduces the value of R0 ≡ R0∗ (σ = 0). Control parameters σ, ρ, θ, α,
and l are amenable to intervention by public health interventions.

2.2. During-outbreak vaccination. During outbreak vaccination is modeled by
the addition of a vaccinated class V (Figure 1). Susceptible moved at the rate χ W
N
into V ; that is,
W
,
N
where χ is the rate at which susceptibles are vaccinated per day, and  is the efficacy
of the vaccine. It is assumed that the rate of vaccination depends on the proportion
of people in the isolation class (W/N).
V̇ = χ

3. Results.
3.1. Pre-outbreak vaccination. Pre-outbreak vaccination consists in reducing
the susceptible class by a fraction σ through vaccination. To find the critical vaccination rates, we solved R0∗ (σ) = 1 to get an expression for σ in terms of l by
substituting the baseline parameter values (Table 1). In Figure 2, we assume a
worst-case scenario, in which l = 0.4 is constant throughout the time of the epidemic from the Hong Kong outbreak in 2002-2003 [12]. This means that 40% of the
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isolated population can contribute to infection while in isolation. We choose four
values for ρ and θ and plotted σ versus l while fixing ρ for each plot and varying θ.
We explore four values for ρ and θ in the interval [0, 1]. We choose the values for
ρ = [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.975] and θ = [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95] (Table 2).
For any values of ρ and θ, the minimum percentage of the total population that
needs to be vaccinated to control an outbreak (R0∗ < 1) does not exceed 73%. Thus,
even though isolation effectiveness plays an important role in the control of SARS,
without any isolation effectiveness (l = 1) an outbreak can be controlled with 73%
pre-outbreak successful vaccination of the population. When l < 0.15 (a reduction of at least 75% in the transmissibility of those under isolation), vaccination is
unnecessary (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. R0∗ (σ, l) = 1 boundary curves to determine the critical vaccination coverage as a function of the isolation effectiveness. When transmission
rate β = 0.25, the minimum pre-outbreak vaccination proportion of the population when isolation is not effective (l = 1), is σ = 0.73.
As we vary the transmission rate β, we obtain different critical vaccination rates
required to prevent an outbreak. We determine the critical values for σ when
β = 0.15, β = 0.25 (Hong Kong scenario) and β = 0.4 (see Figure 3). When
β = 0.15, it is observed that when isolation is completely ineffective, the minimum
proportion of the population needed to be vaccinated does not exceed 54%. When
β = 0.4, this percentage does not exceed 84%.
3.2. Pre-outbreak vaccination simulations. We calculated the total number
of cumulative cases using numerical simulations while varying σ in two cases: (1)
assuming constant isolation effectiveness of l = 0.4 (Hong Kong scenario) and (2)
assuming improvement of isolation effectiveness over time due to improvement of
interventions by using a piecewise function with l0 = 0.4:
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Figure 3. R0∗ (σ, l) = 1 boundary curves for β = [0.15, 0.25, 0.40] to determine the critical vaccination coverage as a function of the isolation effectiveness. As β increases, the minimum σ needed to control an outbreak increases.



l0
l(t) = 0.5l0


0.3l0

if 0 ≤ t < 28,
if 28 ≤ t < 70,
if t ≥ 70.

(2)

Taking an initial value of l0 = 0.4 (from the Hong Kong data) for the first four
weeks of the outbreak, parameter l then reduces to 0.2 for the next six weeks, and
finally reduces to l = 0.12 for the rest of the outbreak. This decrease means that
fewer people in the isolated class can infect susceptibles as the outbreak progresses.
We explore θ and ρ to find reasonable baseline values. We test the values
θ = [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95] while fixing ρ = 0.975 from [15]. When θ = 0.25 (meaning
25% of the untraced latent individuals self-isolate), the total epidemic size is 53.22%
of the total population. When θ = 0.95 (95% of the untraced latent individuals
self-isolate) the percentage of cumulative cases is 52.65%. The small difference of
0.57% in cumulative cases shows that θ is not crucial for the final epidemic size.
Table 2. R0∗ values for different θ and ρ when σ = 0 and l = 0.4
Parameter
θ = 0.25
θ = 0.5
θ = 0.75
θ = 0.95

R0∗
1.43
1.427
1.423
1.42

Parameter
ρ = 0.25
ρ = 0.5
ρ = 0.75
ρ = 0.975

R0∗
1.64
1.57
1.49
1.43

THE ROLE OF VACCINATION IN THE CONTROL OF SARS

759

However, varying ρ, while fixing all other parameters, has a greater effect on the
cumulative cases (see Figure 4 for the changes in the cumulative cases when θ = 0.5
and ρ varies). Again, the values for ρ we test are ρ = [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.975]. When
ρ = 0.25 (25% of the contacts of an average infected person were traced), the total
epidemic size is 60.58% of the total population, and when ρ = 0.975 (97.5% of the
contacts are traced) the total epidemic size is 53.02% of the total population size.
The difference from the lowest to the highest values of ρ is 7.56%. This implies
that varying ρ, the proportion of latent contacts that are traced, has a greater
impact on the final epidemic size than θ, which is the proportion of untraced latent
individuals that self-isolate. We choose ρ = 0.975 as in [15]. We assume that 97.5%
of the latent people can be traced with modern technology and resources. This
estimate is taken from Kaplan et al. [15] on the role of mass vaccination in the case
of a smallpox attack in New York City. We assume that the same resources used
for tracing smallpox can be used to trace SARS cases.

Cumulative Number of Cases (Proportions)

0.7

0.6

0.5

!=0.25
!=0.50

0.4

!=0.75
0.3

!=0.975

0.2

0.1

0
0

500

1000

1500

Time (days)

Percentage of cumulative number of cases with σ = 0, θ = 0.5,
and ρ = [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.975]. There is a more significant change in cumulative
cases when varying ρ than when varying θ. The percent change in the total
number of cases when ρ = 0.25 to ρ = 0.95 is a 7.56% decrease.

Figure 4.

Since the impact of ρ on the total epidemic size is more significant than the
impact of θ, we explore different scenarios when ρ varies during the outbreak. Using
a step function for ρ, we assume that a smaller proportion of the latent individuals
is traced at the beginning of the outbreak, where
(
ρ = 0.5
if t < y,
ρ(t) =
(3)
ρ = 0.975 if t ≥ y.
That is, we assume that 50% of the latent individuals are traced in the first
28, 100, 200, or 300 days of the outbreak (y ∈ [28, 100, 200, 300]), and then tracing
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Cumulative Number of Cases (Proportions)

improves to 97.5% at time y. We observed that the number of cumulative cases
does not change significantly when ρ = 0.975 during the entire outbreak.
Using the parameter values from Table 1 and the values for θ = 0.5, ρ = 0.95,
initial population N0 = 107 , the initial number of infectious cases I0 = 100 individuals, assuming constant isolation effectiveness during the outbreak, and increasing
σ (the proportion of susceptible vaccinated prior to the outbreak), the duration of
the outbreak decreases over time. Since a large percentage of latent individuals are
traced (97.5%), they are sent directly to the isolation class, W . The increase in
the W class causes susceptible individuals to move faster into the infected classes,
because a higher number of isolated individuals can infect susceptible individuals.
Thus, cases accumulate faster and the outbreak is over sooner (see Figure 5).

1

0.2

0.5

0.1
a)
!=0

0
0

500

1000

0
0

1000

2000

3000

!5

!4

1

b)
!=0.2

x 10

3

x 10

2
0.5

0
0

c)
!=0.4

1000
Time (days)

2000

1
0
0

d)
!=0.6

200

400

600

Time (days)

The cumulative number of cases over time as a function of σ.
For this simulation l = 0.4 (Hong Kong data). For σ = 0 (R0∗ = 1.43) the
cumulative number of cases is 53.02% of the population size, σ = 0.2 (R0∗ =
1.14) the cumulative number of cases is 18.93%, σ = 0.4 (R0∗ = 0.86) the
cumulative number of cases is 0.00914%, σ = 0.6 (R0∗ = 0.57) the cumulative
number of cases is 0.0026374%. Initial conditions: N0 = 107 and I0 = 100.

Figure 5.

To further explore the effect of pre-vaccination on the total number of cases, we
construct a plot of the proportion of total cumulative cases from the total population
versus σ (see Figure 6). There is a significant reduction in the total number of
cumulative cases when 0 ≤ σ ≤ 0.27. If more than 27% of the total population is
vaccinated before the outbreak, then the number of cumulative cases still decreases,
but at a slower rate. Therefore, if pre-outbreak vaccination is implemented, then
at least a coverage of 27% will be needed to observe a significant decrease in the
total cumulative cases.
Improving isolation during the outbreak, as in equation (2), and increasing σ
decreases the duration of the outbreak as well (Figure 7).
If isolation improves earlier than four weeks into the outbreak, there will be a

Cumulative Number of Cases (Proportions)
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0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

!
The cumulative number of cases as the proportion of successful
vaccinated susceptibles σ varies between 0 and 1. For this simulation, l = 0.4
(Hong Kong data) and remains constant throughout the outbreak. Initial
conditions: N0 = 107 and I0 = 100.

Figure 6.

smaller number of SARS cumulative cases. If this improvement takes place later in
the outbreak, then the number of SARS cumulative cases will increase. However,
if σ > 0.3 (pre-outbreak vaccination), then the outbreak will be controlled, since
R0∗ < 1 would be achieved. In other words, effectively vaccinating a small proportion
of the population before an outbreak occurs will be the best strategy in controlling
the outbreak, and no other measure will be needed.
3.3. During-outbreak vaccination (with or without pre-outbreak vaccination). We now consider different scenarios for our single outbreak model: duringoutbreak vaccination (where the proportion of pre-outbreak successfully vaccinated
individuals σ = 0), and pre-outbreak vaccination combined with during-outbreak
vaccination (where σ ∈ [0, 1]).
As in the case with pre-outbreak vaccination, we run two types of simulations
in which we explore the total epidemic size 1) when isolation effectiveness by parameter l = 0.4 (Hong Kong data) is kept constant during the outbreak, and 2) in a
more realistic scenario in which l is a step function as in equation (2).
Since previous SARS models and recent data did not discuss the efficacy of a
SARS vaccine () and the rate at which susceptibles are vaccinated during the outbreak (χ), we examine ranges for these parameters and their effect on the total
epidemic size.
Health organizations, drug companies, and universities are still searching for a
SARS vaccine. The most promising result in the vaccine research has been a recent
vaccine tested on four African green monkeys [6]. Even though all four monkeys
that received the vaccine became immune to SARS, no conclusions can be drawn
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Cumulative Number of Cases (Proportions)
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The cumulative number of cases over time is changing as the
proportion of successful vaccinated susceptibles, σ, changes. For this simulation, the l step-function (eq. (2)) is implemented throughout the outbreak.
For σ = 0 (R0 ∗ start = 1.43 and R0 ∗ end = 0.436) the cumulative number of
cases is 0.00908%; for σ = 0.2 (R0 ∗ start = 1.14 and R0 ∗ end = 0.349) the
cumulative number of cases is 0.0054054%; for σ = 0.4 (R0 ∗ start = 0.856 and
R0 ∗ end = 0.262) the cumulative number of cases is 0.003245%; for σ = 0.6
(R0 ∗ start = 0.571 and R0 ∗ end = 0.174) the cumulative number of cases is
0.0019971%. Initial conditions: N0 = 107 and I0 = 100.

Figure 7.

yet about its efficacy. Moreover, the SARS vaccine was produced by modifying a
vaccine for HPIV3, and in its current form the vaccine would be efficient only for
children and infants who are immune to HPIV3 [6, 8]. We assumed the range for
the vaccine efficacy to be 0.5 ≤  ≤ 0.9. To obtain a value for χ, we used data
from Kaplan et al. [15]. Using Kaplan et al. [15] estimates, starting with an initial
population of 107 people, the entire population can be vaccinated in ten days after
the start of the epidemic. In our model, we assume that the SARS vaccine will work
only for the susceptible population. We assume a range for χ ∈ [0.2, 0.5]. That is,
if susceptible individuals decide to be vaccinated, they can do so within two to five
days.
We determine the cumulative number of cases depending on the time at which
during-outbreak vaccination is implemented (i.e., after the 30th or 200th day), with
constant isolation effectiveness (l = 0.4). Table 3 shows the percentages of cumulative cases as dependent on the time of the start of the vaccination, with or without
pre-outbreak vaccination.
The results in Table 3 show that if only during-outbreak vaccination is implemented after 30 days from the start of an outbreak, the total number of cumulative
cases will be reduced at least by half, from 53.02% of the population size (no vaccination at all, see Figure 5) to at most 10% (χ = 0.5 and  = 0.9, see Table 3).
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Table 3. Percentage of cumulative number of cases based on the
number of days from the start of an outbreak after which vaccination begins
# of days after which
During-outbreak vaccination
Pre-outbreak
and
During-outbreak
vaccination begins
σ=0
σ = 0.2
σ = 0.4
σ = 0.6
30
10 − 26%
6.35%
0.00913%
0.0026376%
250
11 − 26%
6.41%
0.00913%
0.0026376%
300
12 − 28%
6.44%
0.00913%
0.0026376%
350
14 − 29%
6.48%
0.00913%
0.0026376%
400
20 − 33%
6.54%
0.00913%
0.0026376%
450
29 − 39%
6.62%
0.00913%
0.0026376%
Note: Isolation effectiveness l0 = 0.4 (Hong Kong scenario) is kept constant. When pre-outbreak vaccination is
implemented, the total number of cumulative cases does not change when χ varies in [0.2, 0.5] and  varies in
[0.5, 0.9]. Initial conditions: N0 = 107 , I0 = 100.

When pre-outbreak vaccination is implemented along with during-outbreak vaccination, then the percentage of cumulative cases is reduced from 10% to about
0.00427% (see Table 3). However, the number of days after which during-outbreak
vaccination begins has little influence on the final epidemic size. If 50% of the initial population is vaccinated before an epidemic, then the percentage of cumulative
cases is the same, whether during-outbreak vaccination starts after 30 days or after
450 days (see Table 3).

4. Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis.
4.1. Uncertainty analysis for R0∗ . We performed an uncertainty analysis on
the effective reproductive number R0∗ using the variability in parameter values. We
assume baseline values for α, β, γ2 , and l from [12] and use Monte Carlo simulations
(simple random sampling) to determine the uncertainty of R0∗ . We assume that α1 ∼
Gamma(a=1.9, b=2.5), 1δ ∼ Gamma (a=2.25, b=16), γ12 ∼ Gamma(a=8.9, b=2.6),
and β ∼ exp(µ = 0.25) from [12], based on Hong Kong data. The proportion of
successfully vaccinated individuals, denoted by σ, the proportion of individuals
traced, ρ, and the proportion of latent individuals that self-isolate, θ, are assumed
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. We explore four different distributions for l: l ∼
Unif(0,1), that is, l is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]; l ∼ Beta(a=2, b=2)
where the likelihood of l is a bell-shaped curve with mean= 0.5 and variance= 0.05;
l ∼ Beta(a=1, b=2), which means l decreases linearly in the interval [0,1]; l ∼
Beta(a=2, b=1), which means l increases linearly in the interval [0,1] [12]. We
sample 105 times using these probability distributions for the model parameters.
We compute R0∗ using different distributions for l from each sampling set (see
Figure 8 when l ∼ Beta(a=1,b=2)).
Table 4. Results of uncertainty for R0∗ for different distributions
of l (isolation effectiveness)
Distribution of l
Unif(0,1)
Beta (a=2, b=2)
Beta (a=1, b=2)
Beta (a=2, b=1)

∗
Mean of R0
0.833
0.833
0.586
1.070

∗
Standard Deviation of R0
1.41
1.32
1.02
1.63

∗
Median of R0
0.328
0.365
0.224
0.450

∗
% of R0
<1
76%
75%
83%
69%

Using the cumulative probability density of R0∗ , we determine the probability
that R0∗ < 1 for different l distributions (see Table 4). The distribution of l that
has the most impact on R0∗ is given by l ∼ Beta(a=1, b=2), since it yielded the
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Histogram for R0∗ for l ∼ Beta(a=1, b=2). The mean of R0∗ is
0.586, with a standard deviation of 1.02. The median is 0.224 and 83% of
R0∗ < 1.

Figure 8.

largest percentage of R0∗ < 1 and gives the smallest mean of 0.586 for R0∗ , with a
standard deviation of 1.02. This implies that most cases of R0∗ < 1 occurred when
the distribution for l (isolation effectiveness) was assumed linearly decreasing in
[0, 1].
4.2. Sensitivity analysis for R0∗ . To explore the sensitivity of R0∗ to the variability of the parameters for the pre-outbreak vaccination model, we let λ represent
any of the eight parameter values (σ, l, γ2 , δ, ρ, θ, α, γ1 ). Considering a small
perturbation of λ by ∆λ, a perturbation will appear in R0∗ (∆R0∗ ) as well. The normalized sensitivity index Sλ is the ratio of the corresponding normalized changes
[16]. We defined the sensitivity index for parameter λ as
Sλ =

λ ∂R0∗
∆R0∗ ∆λ
/
= ∗·
,
∗
R0
λ
R0 ∂λ

where λ is a parameter in the quantity R0∗ .
When determining the sensitivity of each parameter (see appendix B), we use θ =
0.5 and ρ = 0.975 from [15], l = 0.4 using estimates from the Hong Kong outbreak
[12]. We noticed that parameter l is the most sensitive parameter whenever σ is less
than about 0.5. That is, the isolation effectiveness parameter is the most sensitive
whenever the pre-vaccination coverage does not exceed about 50% (Table 5 and
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appendix B).
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis of R0∗
Sensitivity index Value
Sσ
-2.3333
Sl
0.9918
Sγ2
-0.5990
Sδ
-0.3946
Sρ
-0.2035
Sθ
-0.0052
Sα
-0.0040
Sγ1
-0.0023
Note: In this table, we use σ = 0.7 and other parameters from Table 1. When
σ < 0.495, l has a higher sensitivity index.

5. Discussion. A number of approaches to modeling the transmission and control
of SARS have been recently used (e.g., [10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]). Here, we have
presented a model that incorporates vaccination as a possible strategy to control an
outbreak of SARS. In contrast to other models for SARS, our model distinguishes
between traced and untraced latent individuals and includes the possibility of preoutbreak vaccination. By using parameters estimated from the SARS outbreak in
Hong Kong (China) [12], we predict the minimal proportion of susceptibles that
need to be successfully vaccinated before an outbreak strikes to achieve control.
The parameters explored most extensively are ρ (the proportion of contacts
traced), θ (the proportion of untraced latent individuals that self-isolate), l (the
effectiveness of isolation), and σ (the percentage of initial population successfully
vaccinated before the outbreak unfolds). We observe that increasing θ does not
reduce the total cumulative cases as much as increasing ρ. Hence, we used θ = 0.5
for our numerical simulations. This implies that in the case of a SARS outbreak,
efforts should go toward improving tracing policies rather than urging people to
self-isolate. We explored the scenario when a small percentage of latent individuals
are traced at the beginning of the outbreak, and there is an increase of this percentage at a later time (i.e., considered a step function for ρ), but observed a very
small change in the total cumulative cases compared to using constant ρ = 0.975
for the whole outbreak.
We computed the reproductive number R0∗ (σ) to obtain results for possible outbreak scenarios. By varying ρ, θ, and l in R0∗ we determine a minimum percentage
of susceptibles that need to be vaccinated to control an outbreak (R0∗ < 1). This
strategy depends on the transmission rate, β. Higher vaccination requirements to
control an outbreak are due to higher transmission rates.
We carried out simulations for different SARS outbreak scenarios: 1) using constant isolation effectiveness throughout the outbreak and 2) improving effectiveness
during the outbreak. Constant isolation effectiveness (l0 = 0.4 from Hong Kong
data), which is our worst-case scenario, leads to a large number of cumulative cases
even when vaccination is implemented. If effective isolation is constant, a significant reduction in total cumulative cases is observed after at least 27% of the initial
susceptible population is vaccinated.
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We also explore during-outbreak vaccination. When the relative isolation effectiveness reduces the transmissibility of the isolation class by 60% (Hong Kong),
pre-outbreak vaccination along with during-outbreak vaccination are needed to reduce the total number of cumulative cases in a significant way. Efforts should also
be spent on tracing people after the start of the outbreak.
Parameter σ was the most sensitive parameter in the reproductive number R0∗ ,
whenever pre-vaccination coverage exceeded about 50% (σ = 0.5) otherwise, isolation effectiveness (via parameter l) was the most sensitive parameter (appendix
B). This means that efforts should be spent on strategies that focus on effective
isolation of infectious cases followed by a pre-outbreak vaccination strategy (if a
vaccine becomes available) and then on improving l, ρ, and θ, respectively.
If a SARS vaccine were to become available, we recommend that vaccination
be implemented as soon as a SARS outbreak is identified in some region of world,
and if necessary, as soon as SARS cases are identified in the population of interest.
Whether vaccination can be administered or not, most efforts should be directed
towards improving effectiveness of isolation and tracing policies. The identification
and isolation of latent (asymptomatic and not yet infectious) individuals through
contact tracing strategies is crucial to achieving global control [24].
Vaccination programs must not only achieve a certain global percentage of coverage but also ensure that such a level is evenly achieved, since pockets of unvaccinated individuals within vaccinated cities may allow the virus to re-invade. Given
that SARS is a relatively new infectious disease, a vaccine is lacking, and consequently, so are appropriate data on the vaccine efficacy, conferred immunity, and
possible sequelae. Antibody titer decay is also influenced by the age of the host.
Therefore, intervention outcomes may be influenced by spatial factors that could
be distributed in a complex fashion.
Acknowledgments. This research was made possible by grants from the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the National Science Foundation,
the National Security Agency, the Provost’s Office at Arizona State University,
and the Sloan Foundation to the Mathematical and Theoretical Biology Institute
(MTBI).
Appendix A. The basic reproductive number. The basic reproductive number (R0 ) is defined as the number of secondary cases produced by a “typical”
infectious individual at the beginning of an epidemic in a completely susceptible
population at a demographic steady state. The reproductive number was computed
using the next-generation operator method [13], where F is the vector of rates of
the appearance of new infections in each compartment; V = V + + V − , where V − is
a vector of rates of transfer of individuals out of the particular compartment; and,
V + is the vector of rates of transfer of individuals into the particular compartment
by all other means. For our model, it follows that



) 
kEn
S
β(1 − ρ) (I+lW
N


 βρ (I+lW ) S 
kEi




N




0

−kθEn − kEi − αI + (δ + γ1 )W 





F =
0
 , V =  −k(1 − θ)En + (α + δ + γ1 )I  .




0
0








0
0
0
0
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Since the infected classes are Ei , En , I, and W , then the dimension of the matrices
F and V (the partial derivatives of F and V with respect to the infected classes)
are 4 × 4 at the infection-free state (En = Ei = I = W = 0). Hence,


0 0 β(1 − ρ)l(1 − σ) β(1 − ρ)(1 − σ)
0 0
βρl(1 − σ)
βρ(1 − σ) 

F =
0 0

0
0
0 0
0
0
and



0
0

0
0
.

(δ + γ2 )
−α
0
(α + δ + γ1 )

k
0

0
k
V =
 −kθ
−k
−k(1 − θ) 0

R0∗ is the spectral radius of F V −1 . Hence, R0∗ (σ) is given by
R0∗ = β(1 − σ)



(1 − ρ)l(1 − θ)α
(1 − ρ)(1 − θ)
ρl
(1 − ρ)lθ
+
+
+
δ + γ2
(δ + γ2 )(α + δ + γ1 )
α + δ + γ1
δ + γ2


.

Appendix B. Sensitivity indices. We performed a sensitivity analysis on R0∗ ,
using the formula
∂R0∗ λ
,
∂λ R0∗

Sλ =

where λ is any parameter in the expression for R0∗ . The following are the sensitivity
indices in terms of R0∗ and the other parameters (see Table 5):

Sl =

lβ(1−σ)[(1−ρ)θ+ρ]
,
(δ+γ2 )R0∗

Sσ =

σ
σ−1 ,

Sδ =

δβ(1−σ)[(1−ρ)(1−θ)−(1−ρ)lθ−ρl]
R0∗ (δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 )

Sρ =

β(1−σ)
R0∗

Sθ =

−β(1−σ)
R0∗

h

lρ(1−θ)
δ+γ2

h

(1−ρ)lθ
δ+γ2

Sγ1 =

−β(1−σ)γ1
R0∗ (α+δ+γ1 )

Sγ2 =

−γ2
δ+γ2

Sα =

+

−

h

−

δ[(δ+γ2 )+(α+δ+γ1 )]
(δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 ) ,

ρ(1−θ)α
(δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 )

−

−

(1−ρ)αθ
(δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 )

(1−ρ)(1−θ)α
(δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 )

ρ(1−θ)
α+δ+γ1

−

(1−ρ)θ
α+δ+γ1

+

(1−ρ)(1−θ)
α+δ+γ1

−

α
α+δ+γ1 .

β(1−σ)γ2 (1−ρ)(1−θ)
(δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 ) ,

αβ(1−σ)(1−ρ)(1−θ)−(1−ρ)lθ−ρl
R0∗ (δ+γ2 )(α+δ+γ1 )

i

i

,

,
i

,
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